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Abstract 
 Prigogine and Stengers (1988) [47] have pointed to the centrality of the concepts of 
"time and eternity" for the cosmology contained in Newtonian physics, but they have not 
addressed this issue beyond the domain of physics.  The construction of "time" in the 
cosmology dates back to debates among Huygens, Newton, and Leibniz.  The 
deconstruction of this cosmology in terms of the philosophical questions of the 17th century 
suggests an uncertainty in the time dimension.  While order has been conceived as an 
"harmonie préétablie," it is considered as emergent from an evolutionary perspective.  In a 
"chaology", one should fully appreciate that different systems may use different clocks.  
Communication systems can be considered as contingent in space and time: substances 
contain force or action, and they communicate not only in (observable) extension, but also 
over time.  While each communication system can be considered as a system of reference 
for a special theory of communication, the addition of an evolutionary perspective to the 
mathematical theory of communication opens up the possibility of a general theory of 
communication. 
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UNCERTAINTY AND THE COMMUNICATION OF TIME 
 
Introduction 
In 1690, Christiaan Huygens noted that: 
 "(I)t is not well to identify certitude with clear and distinct perception, for it is 
evident that there are, so to speak, various degrees of that clearness and 
distinctness.  We are often deluded in things which we think we certainly 
understand.  Descartes is an example of this; it is so with his laws of 
communication of motion by collision of bodies."i 
 
Huygens made this distinction between clarity and certitude primarily because he wished to 
emphasize the importance of experimental work.ii  However, this methodological critique of 
Descartes' ideas has an epistemological implication.  If clarity and certainty are not 
necessarily related, they are different dimensions of knowledge: clarity in knowledge should 
be opposed to confusion, and certainty to uncertainty.  The dynamics between these two 
dimensions of knowledge merit further specification.  The problem of a dynamic interaction, 
however, presumes a notion of time.  Indeed, the construction of "time" has been crucial to 
the development of the new philosophy in the second half of the 17th century. 
 The problem of the communication of time among systems (e.g., clocks) was central 
to Huygens' research programme; the differential calculus enabled Newton and Leibniz to 
develop the concepts of infinite and continuous time within the new physics.  Towards the 
end of the 17th century, these scholars provided natural philosophy with firm mathematical 
and metaphysical foundations.  Additionally, Newton and Huygens formulated 
methodologies on how to achieve more clarity and certainty by empirical investigations. 
 On the one hand, Newton tended towards the empiricist position when he formulated 
his well-known "hypotheses non fingo": 
 "But hitherto I have not yet been able to discover the cause of those properties 
of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not 
deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, 
whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, 
have no place in experimental philosophy.  In this philosophy particular 
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propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered 
general by induction." ([44], at p. 547.) 
 
On the other hand, Huygens provided us with the rationalist counter-position in the 
Cosmotheoros (1698): 
 "I must acknowledge that what I here intend to treat of is not of that Nature as 
to admit of a certain knowledge; I cannot pretend anything as posititvely true 
(for how is it possible), but only to advance a probable Guess, the Truth of 
which everyone is at his own liberty to examine."iii 
 
 These two positions have more or less structured the discussion about scientific 
methods over the past centuries.  The two positions, however, have in common a firm belief 
that one can take either the (un)certainty on the side of the objects of study or the (un)clarity 
in the analyst's mind, and from that starting point unambiguouly bridge the gap between the 
world and our understanding of the world, since a pre-established correspondence between 
the two can be assumed as the basis for their interaction.[32] 
 Further reflections in philosophy on the nature of this transcendental assumption have 
affected the development of physics only marginally, since for physics the epistemological 
boundaries of the Newtonian cosmology remained largely unproblematic.iv  For example, 
Einstein and Infeld acknowledged this cosmology in 1938 as follows: 
"Without the belief that it is possible to grasp the reality with our theoretical 
constructions, without the belief in the inner harmony of our world, there 
could be no science." ([13], at p. 296.) 
 
Other natural scientists (e.g., [8, 46]) have discussed "the arrow of time," but they retained 
the idea of "a unified vision of time."[8] 
 Philosophical reflections, however, have been important for the social sciences, since 
there are many possible understandings of the social world, and many social worlds.  In this 
context, "reality" and its harmony can no longer be taken for granted.  As soon as there are 
more than two systems to synchronize, the interaction can in principle be decomposed in 
more than one way, and therefore the transcendental relation may itself become uncertain.  
If this is historically reflected in philosophy--as it has been--the issue is no longer whether 
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one should build upon the bank of subjective (un)clarity or on the (un)certainty in the 
phenomena, but rather the question of which uncertainty or which unclarity one may wish 
and/or be able to build on.  In the absence of a single metaphysical guarantee for 
preestablished harmony and cosmos, asynchronicity will prevail. 
 In this study, I first deconstruct the modern cosmology in terms of the philosophical 
questions which have been basic to the mathematization of physics in the 17th century.  The 
deconstruction of the cosmology suggests an uncertainty in the time dimension.  In the 
second part of the study, I shall argue that one can nowadays specify the conditions under 
which clarity can be generated in relations among systems which contain and process 
uncertainties.  Since the concept of uncertainty can now be mathematically defined,[51] 
various problems of the 17th century can be reformulated.  For example, uncertainty can be 
considered as the substance of communication.  Communication systems can be studied in 
space and time: they operate in terms of substances which should be considered as force or 
action.  Observed harmony between substances requires explanation. 
 
1. The construction of the modern cosmology 
1.1. "Uncertainty" in the New Philosophy 
 According to Descartes, the act of doubt provides us with a point of departure for 
further investigations.  One is able to infer reflexively from the uncertainty which one finds 
in one's Ego ("cogito") to clarity concerning the existence of the subject of this reflection 
("ergo sum").  With hindsight, Huygens' analysis clarified that Descartes had formulated a 
one-dimensional theory of knowledge, namely one in which the subject is able to replace 
uncertainty with clarity by reflection.  In order to be able to distinguish between 
mathematical clarity and empirical uncertainty, Huygens needed a two-dimensional theory of 
knowledge: whatever one derives on a priori grounds, and however clear this may be in 
mathematical terms, the inference remains an hypothesis about the physical world which yet 
needs to be tested empirically in order to become more certain.   
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 What is the nature of the relation between contingent uncertainty and analytical 
clarity if one distinguishes between the two?  Let me quote Huygens again: 
 "Against Cartesius' dogma, that the nature or notion of a body should consist 
in extension alone, I have a notion of space that differs from the notion of a 
body: space is what may be occupied by a body."v 
 
 Note that Huygens uses "may be."  In opposition to Descartes, this natural 
philosopher and his contemporaries had achieved an understanding of empty space (Newton) 
and infinite time (Leibniz), which allowed them to use abstract mathematical theories to draw 
inferences about physical reality which could be tested.  Thus, the arrow of inference was 
reversed: space was no longer considered exclusively as a consequence of the extension of 
matter, as had been the case in Cartesian philosophy.  Newton would radicalize this point of 
view and introduce concepts like gravity, which cannot easily be given a geometrical 
interpretation, while the availability of such (algebraic) concepts is even conditional for the 
physical understanding. 
 While Newtonian thought is most versatile in terms of an idealized mathematical 
system in addition to the contingent mechanical worldview, the Cartesian Huygens was 
pursued by philosophical problems.  Huygens, however, was in the first place a physicist; he 
was so deeply impressed by Newton's Principia (1687) that he expressed the wish to pay the 
author a visit, which became possible after the Glorious Revolution in England (1688-1689). 
 After his return he stated in a letter to his friend Leibniz that he found Newton's hypothesis 
concerning gravitation still "absurd."vi  Analogously, he had reservations concerning 
Leibniz' differential notations, since they were based on algebra and not on geometry.  
However, from 1690 onwards, Huygens began to use Leibniz' notation for differentials along 
with ideas from Newton's physics in his own work, despite his philosophical reservations.  
Physics had definitively become one theoretical system. 
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1.2.  The Assumption of A System of Reference 
 The philosophical point in the above quotations is different from the question of their 
usefulness for the understanding of the history of early modern physics.  Obviously, the 
"cogito" leaves room for other notions of the "res extensa" than the Cartesian identification 
of a body with extension.  If one is uncertain, one is uncertain about something.  But is the 
cogito itself able to determine also the nature of the res extensa? 
 The cogito itself clarifies only the contingency of the cogitans: a system which is in 
doubt about itself is reflexively aware that it could have been otherwise, i.e., that it is 
contingent.  This contingency refers to other possible states of the same system.  The 
system which is uncertain, refers to a demarcation from something else (e.g., itself in another 
state) which can thus be considered as environment.  But a reference to a demarcation is not 
a demarcation!  In the act of doubt, the contingency cannot determine itself substantively, 
since it does not in itself contain knowledge about the existence or the nature of an outside 
world. 
 Therefore, the theory of knowledge in Cartesian philosophy remained internal to the 
Ego.  The argument of "Cogito ergo sum" preceded the step in which Descartes invoked the 
Goodness of God ("Veracitas Dei") as a warrant that our (internal) imaginings about the 
(external) world correspond with a physical reality (including our own corporal existence).  
There is nothing in contingency itself which guarantees that this environment exists as "res 
extensa," i.e., as physical matter, and not as mere imagination.  The self-reference, however, 
provides the reflexive cogito with a previous state, and thus with a reference to finite time.  
Consequently, the delineation of the contingent Ego implies a reference to a transcendent 
Other, which is expected to contain infinite time.  However, the contingent self can only be 
delineated negatively from its Transcendency.  The Transcendency remains only an 
expectation.  Any positive delineation of the contingency requires additional information, 
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i.e., information which does not originate internally within the cogito, but from its relation 
with an environment. 
 As long as there is no delineation from an external system, there can only be 
contingency in relation to transcendency.vii  As soon as something else is considered as 
different but contingent, one has to assume communication between system and environment, 
communication in time, and communication of the system's time. 
 
1.3.  "Time" in the New Philosophy 
 The question about how time is communicated among systems and with reference to 
infinite time, therefore, was crucial to the new philosophy.  In relation to transcendency, 
contingency contained only its own time which could negatively be delineated from infinite 
time, i.e. Eternity.  In order to infer beyond God to the existence of a contingent system 
other than the cogito, one had to raise the question of how the systems manage to remain 
synchronous over time.  Can they use their mutual communications for updates or do they 
have to refer independently to a "standard clock"?  Is it necessary to specify God's role in 
the synchronization among the substances? 
 In philosophy the synchronicity problem is at the core of the well-known mind-body 
problem: how do the body and the mind communicate when knowledge of the physical world 
is generated, and subsequently, how do they communicate in human action as an expression 
of the free will?  Descartes originally raised this question in terms of the communication 
between the substances: how do the res cogitans (thinking) and the res extensa (matter) 
communicate?  The metaphor of two clocks which run synchronously was introduced by the 
Cartesian Geulincx.  However, not only the metaphor, but also the formulation in terms of 
communication between two systems remained central throughout the 17th century.  For 
example, when Leibniz published his system in the Journal des Savants at the end of this 
century, he entitled his treatise "New systems of the nature and of the communication of 
substances, and of the union between the soul and the body" [32]. 
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 In the metaphor of the synchronicity between two clocks, the one clock represents the 
physical world, the other the spiritual one.  How does it happen that our mental perceptions 
correspond with reality?  As noted, Descartes' metaphysical answer to this problem had 
been that the Goodness of God implies that He is not expected to continuously deceive us.  
However, in a mechanistic philosophy, one would like an answer to the question of how this 
mechanism works also in physical terms. 
 Huygens made this very question central to his research programme for the new 
physics.  The practical question of the day was the problem of keeping clocks synchronous 
on board of ships at sea.  Huygens generalized this problem to the question of the 
communication between oscillating bodies in a study of 1673, entitled Horologium 
oscillatorum.  Note that this latter study was not a contribution to the practical problem, 
which had already been amply discussed in his 1655 study entitled Horologium, but more 
importantly to the major theoretical problems in the new Natural Philosophy.[60] 
 While Huygens gave an essentially mechanistic answer to the question of how 
different systems communicate time, Geulincx at Leuven had proposed that at the moment of 
each communication God had to intervene to keep the two clocks synchronous (so-called 
"occasionalism").  In a study, entitled Harmonie préétablie (1696), Leibniz elaborated a 
third possibility for keeping the two clocks operating synchronically: 
 "One may think of two clocks which are completely synchronous.  This can 
only happen in three ways: firstly, it may be based on a mutual influence 
among them; secondly, that continuously somebody takes care; thirdly, on the 
internal precision of each of them." ([33], at p. 272.) 
 
 Leibniz then attributed the first hypothesis to Huygens; the second refers to the noted 
continuous need for intervention; and he chose the third option himself.  This option 
enabled Leibniz to integrate into a single encompassing system the metaphysical issues at 
stake, the mathematical concept of infinite time which he (and Newton) had derived a few 
decades earlier when developing the calculus, and the mechanistic world picture of 
Cartesianism. 
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1.4.  "The Time of the Lord is the Best of All Times"viii 
 Leibniz, however, emphasized the hypothetical character of the harmonie préétablie, 
which he proposed.  He formulated that  
 "Once one has understood the possibility of this hypothesis of correspondence, 
one also understands that it accounts best for reason, and that it provides us 
with a wonderful image of the harmony in the universe, and of the perfection 
of God's works."ix 
 
This meta-physical hypothesis addressed, among other things, a problem which had remained 
an open question within the mechanistic philosophy, namely how the human soul once 
embodied could return to the transcendent Eternity from which it was derived as a 
contingency in the inference as discussed above.  In addition to other radical implications 
(e.g., Spinozism), Cartesianism implied a mechanistic cosmology that could lead to 
contradictions in the basic assumptions concerning this issue in Christianity [24].  For 
example, we know from correspondence that Huygens was sometimes deeply troubled about 
the problem of the immortality of the soul.x 
 The quest for an encompassing solution became particularly urgent in 1685 when 
Protestantism was under vehement attack by the counter-reformation.  In this year, Louis 
XIV reinvoked the Edict of Nantes, and in England, a Catholic king (James II) had acceded 
to the throne.  Protestantism was on the defensive; one might even say on the verge of a 
breakdown.  Could it be provided with other options than a retreat to defensive orthodoxy in 
its relation to the new philosophy?  How could the internal contradictions between the new 
religion and the new philosophy be resolved in order to maintain both freedom of religion 
and the explaining power of the emerging modern science?  Was there any possibility of 
bringing these great systems into harmony? 
 In the winter of 1685-1686, Leibniz wrote the first draft of his Discours de la 
Métaphysique; Newton completed his Principia,xi to be published in 1687; and Huygens was 
ill and depressed in The Hague, since he was not allowed to return to the Academy in Paris of 
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which he had been director for so many years.xii  Although there would remain differences 
of opinion among these three scholars,xiii in the years 1685-1689 the integrated system in 
terms of Newtonian physics, the calculus, and Protestant metaphysics was put into place.  
When Huygens came to visit Newton in 1689, his oldest brother Constantijn was the private 
secretary of the new King of England (William of Orange).  Newtonianism could thus 
become the basic ideology for the English revolution from 1689 onwards [23].  A 
metaphysically, scientifically, and ideologically supported coalition could be formed between 
England, Holland, and Prussia, which laid the foundation for the 18th-century 
Enlightenment.xiv 
 In the decades preceding these events, the various ingredients to resolve the tensions 
between the mechanistic philosophy and the Christian religion had been developed piecemeal 
in the relations and oppositions among Huygens, Leibniz, and Newton (see, e.g., [10]).  
Huygens agreed with Newton about replacing the Cartesian vortices with a concept of 
continuous and empty space; Leibniz and Newton had developed the mathematical 
idealization of differential calculus independently of each other; and all three of them 
believed in the existence of absolute and infinite time.  The grand synthesis, however, was 
forced by the historical situation. 
 After 1689, the scientific system had been brought into harmony with its surrounding 
culture by assuming order in the time dimension.  The human soul has to live on earth, i.e., 
in finite time, but its immortality provides it with the possibility to follow Christ, and to 
return to God's eternal time.xv  The semantics of differential calculus serves most graciously 
and convincingly to illustrate the transition between the transcendent and the contingent: the 
discreteness of this contingent world should be understood as a manifestation of continuous 
time and space.  The infinitesimal transition exhibits how worlds other than the one which 
we perceive with our senses resound within it.  One would not even be able to understand 
the contingent properly without drawing upon the idealized model.  More generally, 
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understanding physical communication through the mathematical model provided a mental 
model to reconcile the idealistic and the mechanistic interpretations of experimental facts. 
 
2.  The deconstruction of the modern cosmology 
 The cosmology warranted order within each of the substances and between them, so 
that what seemed at first to be different (i.e., the Word and the world) could be resolved into 
harmonic correspondence.  The harmonic solution at the cosmological level warrants 
reconciliation at the metaphysical one: nature is revealed to us by God's grace, and therefore 
we are able to reconcile our mathematical image with physical reality.  While there is 
initially a gap between the complexity of the contingencies and the idealization in the model 
system, the two dimensions of mathematical clarity and empirical uncertainty can be brought 
to interact, and we are warranted in achieving scientific understanding, i.e., true knowledge 
about the world. 
 Thus, I showed that the question of how clarity can be related to uncertainty was 
raised in the 17th century, but was then answered in a specific way in order to secure the 
progress of physics in a non-secularized world.  I shall argue in the second part of this study 
that one can nowadays specify the conditions under which clarity can be generated in 
relations among systems which contain and process uncertainties. 
 
2.1.  "Uncertainty" as the substance of communication 
 Indeed, in the philosophy of science, in the social sciences, and most pronouncedly in 
the reflexive sociology of science (e.g., [59]), we have increasingly lost all notion of truth in 
the transcendental sense of fundamental certainty; we have become fundamentally uncertain. 
 Can anything more than informed opinion be formed in sociological theorizing?  Does this 
imply that one can ultimately achieve only uncertainty? 
 As noted above, "uncertainty" may substantively mean something different in various 
dimensions.  Therefore, we need a definition which leaves room for variation in the 
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substantive meaning of uncertainty, i.e., a definition which is analytically independent of any 
system of reference.  A definition without reference to a system, however, has to be 
content-free, i.e. a mathematical definition.xvi 
 In 1948, Shannon provided us with such a definition of "uncertainty" as part of the 
mathematical theory of communication [51].  Shannon defined "information" as the 
uncertainty contained in a finite sequence of signals or, more generally, in a distribution.  
Whether one should call this quantity "information" has been heavily debated (e.g., [3, 6, 56]). 
 But more important than these semantic problems, was Shannon's equation of the concept 
with probabilistic entropy [18].  In contrast to thermodynamic entropy, however, the 
probabilistic uncertainty is defined yet content-free, i.e., it is still open to substantive 
specification. 
 Thermodynamic entropy is a measure of disorder among molecules in 
thermodynamics, and it can also be used to describe the direction of time in evolutionary 
processes (e.g., [7, 8, 56]).  In the social sciences, however, one is usually not interested in 
the non-equilibrium thermodynamics of a physico-chemical system, but in the development 
of uncertainty, disorder, and complexity in social systems.  Thus, the uncertainty refers to a 
different substance, and it can be reflected only by a different theory of communication.   
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2.2.  The probabilistic interpretation of communication 
 How can substances communicate if there is no pre-established harmony and 
synchronicity?  The envisaged generalization of concepts like "entropy" and 
"communication" to the dynamics of systems other than the physico-chemical one requires a 
further reflection on the assumptions contained in the mathematization of physics.  As noted, 
the concept of communication is much older than the thermodynamic concept of entropy [4] 
or its probabilistic interpretation in the mathematical theory of communication [51].  
Descartes and Huygens, for example, had to assume that "motion" (momentum and energy) is 
communicated in a collision in order to be conserved, and thus they discussed this 
conservation in terms of the "laws of communication of motion."xvii  I showed above that 
Huygens gave the Cartesian concepts a physical interpretation.  I shall now use the example 
of the collision in a classical system to infer the probabilistic concept of communication from 
this older notion of communication. 
 In a system of colliding balls momentum and energy have to be conserved, and thus 
to be communicated upon collision.  As we know nowadays, the efficiency of the 
communication of momenta in a physical realization depends on the amount of (free) energy 
which dissipates as thermodynamic entropy.  The ideal communication of momenta and 
kinetic energies of the colliding balls is thus dampened by this dissipation.  When the 
physical realization approximates the ideal case, the thermodynamic entropy vanishes, but 
the redistribution of momenta and energies at the macro-level becomes more pronounced 
(since there is less dissipation).  Correspondingly, the message that the collision has taken 
place contains a larger amount of Shannon-type uncertainty.  Thus, the two types of entropy 
can vary independently: the one may increase and the other vanish in the same event.  The 
reason for this independence is that the systems of reference for the two entropies are 
different: thermodynamic entropy refers exclusively to the distribution of, for example, 
momenta and positions among molecules, while the reference system for probabilistic 
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re 
entropy in this case is the system which conserves macroscopic momenta and energy.  
Thermodynamic entropy is generated only in the special case where the communication has 
the physico-chemical system as its substantive reference.xviii 
 Shannon's probabilistic definition of entropy enables us to develop a content-free 
definition of communication systems which operate by processing distributions.  In the 
example above, the macroscopic energy system communicated in terms of the kinetic 
energies of (billiard-type) balls, the momentum system in terms of momenta.  Social 
systems communicate in terms of means of social communication (e.g., discourse, money, 
etc.); human bodies communicate in terms of hormones and neural potentials.  In these 
cases the probabilistic entropy is defined with reference to systems other than the 
physico-chemical one. 
 In summary, the translation of contingent uncertainty into mathematical clarity by 
Descartes has been generalized by Shannon to the understanding of a contingency as a 
probability distribution.  Like the uncertainty in the act of doubt, the mathematical 
awareness of a probabilistic event cannot be given a substantive meaning internally by this 
theoretical system; it needs an external reference.  However, the external reference again 
need not be physical existence.  In systems other than the physical one, other quantities than 
"motion" may have to be conserved, and therefore communicated. 
 For example, in classical chemistry a mass balance for each element involved in the 
reaction is assumed.  In this case, the atoms of the elements are redistributed.  One can 
express the communication of any redistributed quantities as a message which contains 
information, and thus in terms of probabilistic entropy.  The systems (and subsystems)xix a
different with respect to the quality of what is being communicated, not with respect to the 
generation of probabilistic entropy.  If the system under study generates probabilistic 
entropy with respect to two communications (e.g., on the occasion of a collision with respect 
to energy and momentum), a probabilistic entropy is generated in each dimension of 
relevance.  In general, the number of dimensions of the information in the message that the 
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nless 
event happened is equal to the number of systems of reference for the information.  Each 
system of reference adds another quality to the uncertainty, and therefore another dimension 
to the communication. 
 Thus we arrive at a general formulation of the problem noted by Huygens that the 
dimensionality of the uncertainty has to be specified.  When Huygens refered to 
mathematical space and physical extension, he hypothesized two dimensions (i.e., 
mathematical a priori knowledge and physical uncertainty), where Descartes had 
hypothesized only one dimension, in which clarity consequently can substitute for 
uncertainty.  If, for example, in a chemical reaction three (qualitatively different) elements 
have to be balanced in terms of their respective total mass, the message of this event will 
analogously contain a three-dimensional uncertainty. 
 Information is never free-floating, but necessarily itself processed within a contingent 
communication system.  The communication systems are delineated in terms of what they 
communicate.  Whatever they communicate is redistributed in the communication, and this 
redistribution is in itself a message which is sent to all the communication systems with 
which this system can communicate externally.  In a single communication, i.e., by its 
contingent operation, the system communicates internally that it has reached a new state, and 
externally to all coupled systems that this contingency has happened in their environment.  
Analogously, the receiving systems can only receive the message by operating, and thus by 
redistributing their own information contents.  Cycles of communication are thus generated. 
 The complexity increases rapidly (i.e., with the exponent of the number of systems)xx u
the systems are also able to (self-)organize the information. 
 What are the conditions under which communication systems can also organize the 
uncertainty, either among one another or internally?  In other words: what are the conditions 
under which networks can retain and organize information?  As noted, some systems are 
conservative, i.e., the number of elements which can be communicated is fixed.  In general, 
the number of elements (n) which a system contains sets a limit to the information which the 
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system can hold.  One may also express this as the maximal entropy (viz., equal to log(n)).  
As noted above, the number of elements in systems can be multiplied by adding other 
systems of reference to the communication, and thus by increasing the number of dimensions 
in the information (n x m).  Furthermore, open systems like social communication systems 
can be defined only in terms of the communication, and consequently these systems have 
uncertain boundaries.  Each additional node of the network n adds (n - 1) possible links.  In 
general, when the number of elements increases more rapidly than the information content of 
the system, the redundancy which can be defined as the complement of the information 
content also increases.  Thus, the addition of new dimensions or new elements can lead to a 
relative decrease of the probabilistic entropy contained within the system.xxi  In other words, 
the uncertainty can be reduced within the system either by increasing the internal complexity 
or by growth. 
 The maintenance of the system is a balanced outcome of its necessary production of 
(probabilistic) entropy by operating, and this capacity to organize the uncertainty within the 
system.[16, 55]  Self-organization [46] or autopoiesis [41] can only be achieved by 
communication systems which are able to reflexively vary the organization of the uncertainty 
along the time dimension.  In other words, self-organizing systems reconstruct their 
histories so that they can face their future in terms of expectations.  Note that this reflexive 
capacity can never be observed directly, but only hypothesized as an internal mechanism of 
the system(s) under study.[38] 
 In general, communication systems develop through processing, i.e., by redistributing 
whatever they communicate.  With respect to this processing one can distinguish between 
self-referentiality (the internal processing of the message that the a priori distribution of the 
substance of communication was changed into the a posteriori one), and external 
referentiality to all systems of reference.  On the one side, the number of reference-systems 
determines the dimensionality of the information content of the self-referential update.  On 
the other side, the frequency of the update sets the system's clock.  Note that this frequency 
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can be multi-variate, and thus be a frequency distribution, i.e., a spectrum.  The clocks tick 
with a variety of speeds.  There is no a priori reason for harmony: communications are in 
principle asynchronous. 
 Thus, in addition to providing a potentially multi-variate environment for one another, 
the communication systems constitute each others' environments in terms of time.  To the 
extent that communication among systems is sustained, the systems also have to 
communicate frequency distributions in the time dimension.  However, time is not a normal 
variate.  This further complicates the analysis. 
 
2.3.  An example of a multi-system communication 
 Before extending the analysis in the time dimension, let me illustrate this abstract 
conceptualization by elaborating on the simple example of a telephone conversation as a 
communication with relevance for two qualitatively different systems, i.e., the social system 
and the telephone network. 
 First, the contingency of a telephone conversation can be analyzed in terms of 
physical currents through a network which can be mathematically modelled.  The social 
communication in a telephone call, however, remains external to the mathematics of the 
propagation of signals through the lines.  Nevertheless, the social communication system 
and the telephone system interact in this single event.  By operating both systems change as 
a consequence of the interaction.  (Of course, the sending and the receiving systems are also 
involved.)   
 The social system and the telephone network, however, were not a priori in harmony. 
 No perfect deity is involved, but only a couple of engineers who have done their utmost to 
make the telephone system function.  As Latour ([31], at p. 188) noted: "There is no 
preestablished harmony, Leibniz notwithstanding, harmony is postestablished locally through 
tinkering."  However, a user may fail to establish the connection: each communication 
system remains failure-prone in the interaction.  Additionally, each of the two systems, 
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while related to the other system in the unique event of this historic phone call, does not 
contain nor acquire full information about the contingent boundaries of the other system 
through these interactions.  In general, the two systems remain virtual for one each other 
while interacting.  They can observe one another only through the "lens" of the interaction. 
 Although virtual, the two systems are not transparent for one another: it makes a 
difference whether people communicate by telephone or through other means of 
communication, and it may make a difference for the telephone line whether it transported 
data or voice-input (e.g., in terms of costs of the transmission).  In the interaction, the two 
systems "disturb" one each other, but they do not delimit each other.  Thus, they are each 
other's environment only in the specific sense of having a communication window on each 
other.  Note the difference here from the concept of the relation between system and 
environment in, for example, biology.xxii 
 In summary, the two systems disturb each other in the event of the historical 
interaction.  The disturbance is a contingent event, since it could have been otherwise.  It is 
a single contingency, but it has a different relevance for each system of reference.  Within 
each system the uncertainty in the event can be evaluated with reference to the self-referential 
contingency within the respective system.  The contingency of the one system is 
underdetermined by the other, since it is not delineated from it as such, but only in the 
interaction.  Analogously, the time-horizon in the other system is also not delimited by the 
interaction.  The systems communicate in relation to one another autonomously like 
Leibniz' monads, but they are contingent!  However, since they cannot fully perceive each 
other's contingency, the systems are autonomous centres of control in relation to one another, 
and only on this basis can they interact.  In this interaction, it is not clear for each system 
which systems interact, since each system only contains its own contingency, although each 
system is partially also informed about the interacting systems by the interaction. 
 However, only systems which can reflexively reconstruct, in addition to being part of 
a (relational) construction, can produce expectations.  In the reconstruction, each system has 
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no other source of information about the possible interactions in the communication with 
other systems than the information which it can retrieve from its own history.  But the 
system can only generate knowledge internally from this uncertainty, if it is capable of 
storing information about its previous states, and if it is additionally capable of taking this 
information reflexively into memory.  If so, it may position itself historically, and in relation 
to the multi-dimensional space of systems of reference at each moment in time, and thus 
produce meaning in a second-order cybernetics.  Reflexive reconstruction requires the 
capacity of the system to take the contingent self-referentiality of the system's history into 
memory.  Obviously, human cogito's are (among)xxiii systems which can act reflexively. 
 As noted, Huygens reconstructed his experience within his contingent cogito 
differently from Descartes.  However, if a cogito expects that another system is a relevant 
(i.e., disturbing) environment, how many negative instances does the cogito need in order to 
revise this hypothesis?  In other words: how frequently does it internally update this 
reconstruction in relation to the ongoing construction at the operational level?  Additionally, 
one may raise the question of whether social systems or theoretical knowledge systems are 
not only constructed, but are also reconstructive, and whether they are also able to update in a 
second-order cybernetics.  However, this raises further questions about the dynamics of 
distributed memory management, since the memory function of social systems is 
operationally located in human beings [36, 39]. 
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2.4.  Extension to the time dimension 
 Remember that we arrived in the first part of this study at the conclusion that without 
further demarcation, the reflexive communication system contains only information in the 
time-dimension about the frequency of its self-referential update, and it knows itself to be 
contingent.  However, it can determine what it communicates substantively only with 
reference to an environment; and it can only receive information from the environment 
insofar as the environment consists of other communication systems.  Thus, this notion of a 
system is yet content-free: the contingency refers only to its finite character, its being 
sequenced in time, and its being the yet unspecified substance of a communication system 
among other communication systems. 
 The special character of time as a variate of a communication system was only 
recently made a focus of methodological reflection in the social sciences.  If two (or more) 
systems communicate parts of their expected information content by co-varying, they will 
usually have changed ex post when compared with the situation ex ante.  The co-variation 
represents the interaction, while the remaining variances on both sides represent the 
respective continuities.  In other words, one expects both continuity and change in the 
systems under study.  The remaining parts of the variances co-vary with a previous state of 
the system (i.e., over time), and are therefore "auto-correlated."  If variances are 
auto-correlated, then so are their error terms, and this violates a central assumption in 
regression analysis [5].  Furthermore, a multi-variate system is expected to develop 
differently from a set of non-coupled elements.  Since each two or more of these elements 
may form a system (or a subsystem within a system), the number of possible expectations for 
future behaviour increases exponentially with the number of elements, and thus the inductive 
analysis rapidly becomes over-complex.xxiv  The methodological statement that time-series 
data should not be used for regression analysis without correction for auto-correlation in the 
data, means in qualitative terms that change in the multi-variate data can only be assessed on 
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the basis of an hypothesis for the delineation of the self-referential system(s) that exhibit the 
observable interaction(s). 
 Qualitative sociologists, therefore, are right when they state that existing statistical 
models in the social sciences cannot cope with the complexities of social developments in the 
historical dimension.  Social science statistics is most sophisticated in addressing problems 
of multi-variate analysis, but in a dynamic design there are shortcomings with respect to the 
combination of the multi-variate and the time series perspective.[34]  How can an historical 
series of events be assessed for its significance in relation to the range of developments 
which might have occurred? 
 The common solution on the qualitative side is to take the historical axis as a sort of 
independent variable, to which all other developments are then discursively "regressed" in a 
narrative.  This solution, however, is irreflexive with respect to the time dimension; one 
should not assume that there exists one single (i.e., historical) time.  Time can only be 
defined with reference to a clock, and a clock can only be a system's clock.  System clocks, 
however, may tick according to a spectrum of different frequencies. 
 In general, clocks of contingent systems are expected to be asynchronous.  There is 
no a priori reason why the various periodicities should be the same for different systems, i.e., 
why different systems should operate synchronously.  Synchronization is a local event, 
which requires explanation.  For example, it is only a consequence of the rotation of the 
earth that many systems on earth happen to be updated daily.  In addition to whatever 
information may be communicated, systems with a history must also update mutually, and 
occasionally must synchronize in the time dimension. 
 Communication systems generate variation for each other by redistributing their 
configurations.  A reflexive analyst may be able to use the observable interactions as 
information about the systems under study, and about their development.  The systems are 
not observed, but remain expectations.  Thus, in order to solve the problem of 
"auto-correlation" in the data, one has to reverse the reasoning: auto-correlation is not first to 
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be corrected for on the basis of an assumed ideal case, but systems can only develop over 
time self-referentially, i.e., with reference to themselves at a previous moment.  If the 
(reconstructive) analysis leads to the conclusion that the variations are not 
self-referential--i.e., not auto-correlated--this may indicate a special case where the systems 
under study changed so importantly that a completely different system emerged (cf. [35]).  
Alternatively, the interacting systems may not have been correctly hypothesized. 
 In general, communication in the time dimension is an event like all other 
communications.  What is communicated is a frequency distribution (i.e., a spectrum).[54]  
Analogously to communication in other dimensions, some communication systems are only 
able to communicate this information, others are able to store it, and specific ones are able to 
reflect upon it and give it an interpretation.  Note that communications are discrete events, 
and that thus continuous time is an idealization by the reconstructive system.  Consequently, 
one should be cautious in using differential calculus for the reconstruction because of the 
assumptions contained in it concerning the limit transition to continuous time.xxv  If the 
post-modern understanding were to assume a standard clock, it might be caught eventually 
within the very cosmology which it wished to overcome.  Synchronization among systems 
always requires explanation. 
 
3.  Towards a general theory of communication 
 In analogy to the probabilistic interpretation of entropy, and the consequential 
definition of time in terms of spectra of frequencies, one can give a probabilistic 
interpretation to concepts in physics which build on the notion of entropy.  However, since 
codified knowledge in physics is logically consistent, other concepts of modern physics can 
also be given a probabilistic, i.e., non-physical, interpretation in a mathematical theory of 
communication. 
 How should one understand a probabilistic interpretation of concepts and laws from 
physics?  An insightful access is provided by using those concepts which, like the 
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Boltzmann equations, rely heavily on the concept of entropy.  From the probabilistic 
interpretations of these laws and concepts one can derive content-free (mathematical) theory, 
which can subsequently be given meaning with reference to systems other than the 
chemico-physical one. 
 In practice, computer scientists and cognitive scientists have already begun to 
investigate the usefulness of Boltzmann equations for modelling complex network problems 
(e.g., [54]).  For example, if a system tends to be in discrete states, the probability of finding 
the system in each of these states is not different in the computation than the probability of 
finding an electron in the various orbits which are allowed in an atom.  (These discrete 
states may also be considered as "attractors.")  Thus, we have the rich mathematical 
apparatus of physics at our disposal for studying systems which can be described in terms of 
probability distributions. 
 Let us take the concept of probabilistic temperature as an example.  At prevailing 
probabilistic temperatures one observes both the (self-)organization of systems (i.e., storage 
of probabilistic energy) and their generation of entropy in interactions (i.e., dissipation of 
probabilistic energy).  However, if one "freezes" the systems, one removes the factor of 
dissipation by bringing all systems to their lowest energy states (according to the Boltzmann 
equation).  In chemical physics, we know this state as, for example, crystalline.  The 
attractors can be sorted separately, since they "peak" against one another in the observation at 
extremely low probabilistic temperatures.  Note, however, that a probabilistic temperature is 
not a physical temperature, but a content-free concept which can only be given meaning with 
reference to a system (or a system of systems). 
 The range of applications of these probabilistic simulations is fascinating: on the one 
hand, in cognitive psychology attractors are constructed by training computer networks, e.g., 
for pattern recognition (so-called "Boltzmann-machines"; cf. [12, 20, 49]).  On the other 
hand, for example, Kuhn's [26] concept of "paradigms" provided us with a mental model of 
the possibility of attractors in the social system: the paradigm not only controls what is 
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communicatable within it, but also shapes a social boundary between those who are "inside" 
and "outside" the relevant scientific community.  Analogously, regimes can be considered 
as the higher-order attractors of interactions among localizable trajectories and socially 
distributed learning processes.xxvi 
 The extension of concepts from physics to non-physical realms may sound at first like 
positivism, but this is not positivism.  First, we did not impose the model of physics 
normatively upon the other sciences, but we used the results of modern physics reflexively 
for the understanding of systems other than the chemico-physical one by first giving the 
concepts a different (i.e., probabilistic) interpretation.  Other systems are, among other 
things, much more complex than the chemico-physical one in terms of what is being 
communicated.  For example, in a simple biological system a large number of mass balances 
are already involved.  In psychological systems, people process feelings and thoughts, 
which are most difficult to operationalize so that they can be externally observed.  In social 
systems, people communicate by using language and symbolic media of communication.  
The nature of these communications, i.e., their operationalization, can only be specified by 
theorizing at the relevant systems level.  Thus, the observable interactions should not be 
taken as the units of analysis.  They are the phenotypical results which challenge the 
theoretical understanding for specifying the genotypical mechanisms.[28, 37]  A general 
theory of communication can be expeted to guide us with respect to the algorithmic 
modelling of the interactions among the so specified communication systems, and to provide 
us with the mathematics for explaining their probabilistic behaviour over time. 
  
 
 24
 
4.  Discussion and Conclusions 
 The embeddedness of the knowing subject in what it wants to investigate pointed to 
the reconstructive and reflexive nature of human knowledge.  However, in the 
epistemological reflection one originally focussed on the question of what specific 
contingency meant for the development of the whole, which was itself specified in terms of a 
transcendency.  In the natural sciences, for example, one has assumed that one could 
abstract from the specific positions of people with reference to the natural environment by 
using the concept of a transcendental subject. 
 In relation to society, or more generally with reference to social systems, this 
metaphysically warranted assumption of commonality disintegrated in the 19th century (cf. 
Marx).  The claim of an objective meta-position is nowadays untenable in the social 
sciences, since it is, for example, irreflexive to the bias which is necessarily brought into the 
analysis by initial assumptions.  Whether this bias is a class position, a male bias or a wish 
to dominate the discourse (cf. Foucault) is secondary.  The primary point is that a theoretical 
system reconstructs the social system from a particular point of view. 
 The mere formulation of the objective of general theory, therefore, may seem an 
invitation to obscurity for those social scientists and philosophers who deny the possibility of 
general theory on normative and sociological grounds.  Indeed, the issue of general theory 
in sociology emphatically raises the issue of the position of the observer, and of the theorist's 
own historicity.  Since Max Weber this complex of issues has been debated in terms of the 
(voluntaristic) theory of action [42].  However, does the historicity of an individual act 
destroy a priori the possibility of reconstructing society by using a theoretical model?  In 
my opinion, the problem of historicity specifies only one criterion for a theoretical model, 
namely that it should be able to account for historicity.  Additionally, theory should be able 
to cope with its own historical contingency reflexively, i.e., to understand itself in terms of a 
reconstruction. 
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 Of course, the specification of a general theory of communication goes beyond the 
scope of this study.[37, 38]  The crucial point, however, is that neither the substance under 
study nor the scientific communication system should be considered as spatial extensions 
(e.g., domains) only; all communication systems contain contingency in four dimensions, i.e., 
in space and time.  Observable stability is the special case in which one has to assume "the 
continual reiteration or propagation of an already presupposed effort and counter-effort" 
(Leibniz)xxvii or--as we would now say--of a positive feedback.  Thus, an observation can 
only be informative with reference to an expectation, but the theoretical expectation is 
embedded in a system of expectations.  One may wish to close the system at either level, but 
the closure is temporary and can be deconstructed. 
 Newton and Leibniz understood that substance should be considered not as extension, 
but as force or action.  However, they stabilized their theoretical apparatus by basing it on a 
priori foundations.  On the one hand, these scholars were able to entertain concepts like 
"gravity" and "acceleration", since the calculus provided them with the concept of a second 
derivative.  Obviously, if one wishes to explain events in a hyper-space of space and time, 
one eventually needs to supplement the geometrical measurement with an algebraic 
understanding.[cf. 27] 
 On the other hand, this conclusion has consequences for those sciences that have 
hitherto relied on geometrical narratives for their understanding [17, 54].  In a second-order 
theory the theoretical apparatus is itself reflexive on its contingency; it knows itself to be a 
communication system among other possible communication systems, subject to continual 
changes.  But since both the data and their interpretation are in flux, one additionally needs 
an algebraic model for the theoretical self-understanding.  This next-higher-order 
complexity in comparison to Newtonian physics calls for the interpretation of results in 
algorithmic "computerese" as a higher-order extension of the "natural" language that has used 
mainly geometrical metaphors.[2, 28, 37] 
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 A general theory of communication adds to Shannon's mathematical theory of 
communication the concept of systems of reference, and the non-equilibrium perspective.  
With respect to the systems of reference, one needs special theories (by definition).  The 
non-equilibrium perspective enables us to model evolutionary processes such as paradigm 
developments, lifecycles, etc.  The scientific model, however, remains reconstructive, and 
therefore part of a cultural evolution.  The reflexive awareness of this methodological status 
is the one important aspect in which communication theory differs from biological evolution 
theory.  The latter hypothesized "natural selection" by the environment as an external 
principle which independently organizes a variety of taxonomic data.  Evolution theory then 
allows us, for example, to define "missing links" in the evolutionary data, and it guides us in 
searching for unambiguous evidence of these instances.  Reconstructions, however, provide 
us with alternative hypotheses concerning what has guided the system(s) under description.  
The alternative hypotheses may describe various aspects of learning, and the consequent 
emergence of patterns of behaviour and communication, which may then begin to act as 
selection mechanisms.   
 The higher-order selection environments do not have to develop synchronously with 
the systems under study.  A second-order cybernetics between selection and stabilization 
can be assumed (e.g., [30, 38, 40]).  Evolution theory is then the special case in which the 
(natural) environment is considered the single determining factor for selection.  
Sociological data, however, exhibit a multitude of dynamics, and the various systems are 
only hypothesized systems of reference ("attractors") instead of a single evolution.  Thus, in 
relation to biology, the socio-cultural perspective adds reflexivity to the theoretical 
inference.[37, 40]  While in other sciences it may have been fruitful to take either variation 
or selection as predetermined by "Nature" as a cosmologically warranted system of reference, 
sociological theorizing requires a reflexive awareness of the variance and historicity of both 
dimensions. 
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Notes 
i.Huygens [22], Vol. XXI, at p. 541. See also: [14], at p. 37. 
ii.Huygens speaks of his own method as consisting of experientia ac ratione, that is, proceeding with 
experience and reason.[14] 
iii.[22], Bk. I, at pp. 9-10. See: [14], at p. 38. 
iv.Whether this is still the case for quantumphysics is a separate issue. For this discussion, see for 
example [45]. 
v.Huygens [22], Vol. XIX, at p. 325. See also: [15], at p. 131. 
vi.Letter of November 18, 1690. ([22], Vol. IX, at p. 538.) 
vii.Note here the Cartesian notion of God: before delineation, i.e., in its self-referential intimacy, the 
contingency is exclusively defined in relation to its transcendency, i.e., in relation to God.  Since the 
definition is internal to the specific cogito, this implies a self-referential relation to a personal God, 
who is present in the reflection.  In this sense, the Cartesian Ego reflects the Protestant revolution. 
viii.Praise in the opening choir of Bach's cantata Actus Tragicus (1707). 
ix.[32]; translated from the German edition: [33], at p. 269. 
x."Christian (...) qu'estant en l'estat où il se trouve, dans lequel il devroit comme envisager de pres 
l'immortabilité, il s'amuse à la controverter comme une question problematique pour et contre." Letter 
of 22 May 1670 by brother Lodewijk Huygens to the father, Constantijn Sr. ([22], Vol VII, at p. 22.) 
xi.The preface to the first edition gives May 8, 1686 as the date. 
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xii.Huygens had betrayed the Dutch Republic when French armies had attacked and almost destroyed 
it in 1672.  Notably, he had dedicated his Horologium Oscillatorum in 1673 with the following 
opening sentence:  "We are especially indebted to France, Oh Great King, for the rebirth and 
restoration of geometry in this century."  For his glorious role in Paris, see for example: [52]. 
xiii."I have been amazed that Huyghens and Newton assume the existence of empty space.  However, 
this can be explained from the fact that they have persisted to discuss in geometrical terms.  More 
astonishing is it still for me that Newton has assumed an attraction which does not work by 
mechanical means.  When he states with respect to this issue that the bodies attract one another in 
terms of gravitation, then should this not be discarded--at least, with respect to the observable 
interactions among the large bodies in our world system--although it seems that Huyghens also does 
not completely agree with this." (Leibniz in a letter to Bernouilli, 1698; translated from the German 
edition [33], at p. 371.) 
xiv.The Kurfürst of Prussia, Friedrich I, who was later to be crowned as king Fredericus Rex, was a 
nephew of king William of Orange.  His mother Louise Henriette was a daughter of Frederik 
Henderik, Prince of Orange, who had relied heavily on the services of Huygens' father Constantijn Sr. 
 The princess was two years older than Christiaan Huygens, and as children they were raised in the 
same circles in The Hague.  Note also that Friedrich's wife, the later Queen Sophie Charlotte, was 
herself a philosopher.  She was a patroness of Leibniz (who lived in Hannover), and founded the 
Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin upon his instigation in 1700. 
xv.Leibniz (1695) noted that otherwise "the souls (would) remain without purpose in a chaos of 
inextricable matter" ([34], at p. 262). 
xvi.Since mathematics can also be one of the systems of reference, one may also wish to call this a 
meta-mathematical definition (cf. [20]). 
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xvii."Within the framework of the Cartesian program, laws of motion ought to be laws of 
communication of motion expressed in measurable quantities." ([14], at p. 73.) 
xviii.The Szilard-Brillouin relation shows that in this case only a very small part of the 
thermodynamic entropy (S) is probabilistic entropy (H). See also: [12], at p. 60. 
xix.At this level of generality, one is not able to distinguish among systems and subsystems. 
xx.When complexity increases not with the power of n (i.e., nk), but with the exponent of n (i.e., 
exp(ßn)), the problem can be non-polynomial complete, and therefore, becomes uncomputable in 
practice. See, for example: [12, 45].  
xxi.The number of possible states of the network increases with the exponent of the number of its 
nodes. 
xxii.However, the concept of self-organization, and its implications for the relations between systems 
and environments, is often discussed also in relation to (biological) evolution theory. See, among 
others: [25, 29]. 
xxiii.Since the systems and their operations were yet defined as content-free, the human being is 
formally a specification (cf. [30, 38]).  Additionally, one has to specify what is reflected in the 
reflection (e.g., thought, feelings, etc.) and in terms of what it is reflected. 
xxiv.Correspondingly, there are no auto-regressive (AREG and ARIMA) models for multi-variate 
data available, but only for uni-variate trendlines.  If one wishes to predict the behaviour of a system 
of variables, one has to define a systems variable at the aggregate level, but then one risks losing 
perspective on how the variances within the system change.  See also: [34]. 
xxv.Although the analyst may wish to use them for pragmatic reasons, the application of Shannon's 
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formulas to continuous distributions is theoretically more problematic than their application to 
discrete ones. See also: [55], at p. 74. 
xxvi.In a study of the management of natural resources, Allen [1] found two attractors in the parallel 
simulation of the hyperbolic curve of fish against fishing boats. In formal terms, this curve is similar 
to a traditional production function with capital and labour along the axes (cf. [11, 37, 44, 50]). 
xxvii.Quoted from Leibniz' Specimen Dynamicum by [48], at p. 251.  See also: [58]. 
  
 
 31
References 
1. P. M. Allen. Evolution, innovation and economics. In G. Dosi et al. (eds.).  Technical 
Change and Economic Theory, pp. 95-119. Pinter, London (1988). 
2.E. S. Andersen.  Evolutionary Economics. Post-Schumpeterian Contributions. Pinter, 
London (1994). 
3. K. D. Bailey.  Why H does not measure information: the role of the "special case" 
legerdemain solution in the maintenance of anomalies in normal science. Quality and 
Quantity 24 (1990), 159-71. 
4.L. Boltzmann.  Ueber die Beziehung eines allgemeine mechanischen Satzes zum zweiten 
Hauptsatzes der Warmetheorie. Sitzungsber. Akad. Wiss. Wien, Math.-Naturwiss. Kl. 75 
(1877), 67-73. 
5.G. E. P. Box and G. M. Jenkins. Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control. Revised 
edition. Holden-Day, San Francisco (1976). 
6. L. Brillouin. Science and Information Theory. Academic Press, New York (1962). 
7. D. R. Brooks and E. O. Wiley.  Evolution as Entropy. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago/London (1986). 
8.P. Coveney and R. Highfield.  The Arrow of Time. Allen, London (1990). 
9.R. Descartes.  Discours de la Méthode.  Amsterdam (1637). 
10.E. J. Dijksterhuis.  De mechanisering van het wereldbeeld, Meulenhoff, Amsterdam 
(1950). 
11.G. Dosi.  Technological paradigms and technological trajectories, Research Policy 11 
(1982), 147-62. 
12. W. Ebeling.  Chaos, Ordnung, Information.  Deutsch, Thun/Frankfurt a.M. (21991).  
13. A. Einstein and L. Infeld.  The Evolution of Physics.  Simon and Schuster, New York 
(1938; 21966). 
14.A. Elzinga.  On a Research Program in Early Modern Physics, Akademiförlaget, 
Gothenburg (1972).  
  
 
 32
15. A. Elzinga.  Notes on the Life and Works of Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695).  
Department of Theory of Science, Gothenburg; Report No. 88 (1976). 
16.N. Georgescu-Roegen.  The Entropy Law and the Economic Process.  Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. (1971). 
17. D. Haraway.  Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminims and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective, Feminist Studies 14 (1988), 575-99. 
18.N. K. Hayles.  Chaos Bound; Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science. 
 Cornell University Press, Ithaca (1990). 
19.M. Heidegger.  Die Frage nach dem Ding.  Niemeyer, Tübingen (1962). 
20.G. E. Hinton and T. Sejnowski.  Learning and Relearning in Boltzmann Machines. In 
[49], pp. 282-317. 
21.C. Huygens.  The Celestial World's discover'd.  London, 2nd ed. (1722). 
22.C. Huygens.  Oeuvres Complètes.  Publ. Soc. holl. des Sciences, 22 vols., Nijhoff, The 
Hague (1888-1950). 
23.M. Jacob.  The Newtonians and the English Revolution 1689-1720.  Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca NY. (1976). 
24.M. C. Jacob.  The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution.  Knopf, New York 
(1988). 
25.E. Jantsch.  The Self-Organizing Universe.  Pergamon, Oxford, etc. (1980). 
26.T. S. Kuhn.  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago (1962). 
27.T. S. Kuhn.  A Function for Thought Experiments, L'aventure de la science. Mélanges 
Alexandres Koyré, 2: pp. 307-34.  Hermann, Paris (1964) 
28.C. G. Langton, C. Taylor, J. D. Farmer, and S. Rasmussen.  Artificial Life II.  Addison 
Wesley, Redwood City, CA. (1992). 
29.E. Laszlo.  Evolution. The Grand Synthesis.  New Science Library, London (1987). 
30.B. Latour.  Science in Action, Open University, Milton Keyes (1987). 
  
 
 33
31.B. Latour.  The Pasteurization of France.  Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass./London (1988). 
32.G. W. Leibniz.  New systems of the nature and of the communication of substances, and 
of the union between the soul and the body.  Journal des Savants, June 1695. 
33.G. W. Leibniz.  Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie.  E. Cassirer (ed.), 
Meiner, Hamburg (31966). 
34.L. Leydesdorff.  The Static and Dynamic Analysis of Network Data Using Information 
Theory.  Social Networks 13 (1991), 301-45. 
35.L. Leydesdorff.  Irreversibilities in Science and Technology Networks: An Empirical and 
Analytical Approach.  Scientometrics 24 (1992) 321-57. 
36. L. Leydesdorff.  `Structure'/`Action' Contingencies and the Model of Parallel 
Distributed Processing, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (1993) 47-77. 
37.L. Leydesdorff.  New Models of Technological Change: New Theories for Technology 
Studies?  In L. Leydesdorff and P. Van den Besselaar (eds.).  Evolutionary Economics and 
Chaos Theory. New Direction for Technology Studies, pp. 180-92.  Pinter, London (1994). 
38.L. Leydesdorff.  The Evolution of Communication Systems, Systems Research and 
Information Science (in press). 
39.N. Luhmann.  Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt a.M (1984). 
40.N. Luhmann.  Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. (1990). 
41.H. R. Maturana and F. Varela.  Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. 
 Reidel, Boston (1980). 
42.R. Münch.  Theorie des Handelns. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. (1982); Engl. translation: 
Understanding Modernity.  Routledge, London/New York (1988). 
43.R. R. Nelson and S. G. Winter.  An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Belknap, 
Cambridge, Mass (1982). 
  
 
 34
44.I. Newton. Principia (1687); F. Cajori (ed.), Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles 
of natural philosophy and his system of the world; translated into English by Andrew Motte 
in 1729. University of California Press, Berkeley (1934). 
45.R. Penrose.  The Empreror's New Mind.  Oxford University Press, Oxford (1989). 
46.I. Prigogine and I. Stengers.  La nouvelle alliance, Gallimard, Paris (1979); [Order out of 
Chaos.  Bantam, New York, (1984)]. 
47.I. Prigogine and I. Stengers.  Entre le temps et l'éternité, Fayard, Paris (1988). 
48.L. Roberts.  From Natural Theology to Naturalism: Diderot and the perception of 
rapport, Ph.D. Thesis, UCLA, Los Angeles (1985). 
49.D. E. Rumelhart, J. L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group.  Parallel Distributed 
Processing, Vol. I, MIT Press, Cambrige, MA/ London (1986). 
50.D. Sahal.  Technological guideposts and innovation avenues.  Research Policy 14 
(1985), 61-82. 
51.C. E. Shannon.  A Mathematical Theory of Communication.  Bell System Technical 
Journal 27 (1948), 379-423 and 623-56. 
52.S. Shapin and S. Schaffer.  Leviathan and the Air-pump, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N.J. (1985). 
53.T. Shinn.  Géometrie et langage: la structure des modèles en sciences sociales et en 
sciences physiques.  Bulletin de Méthodologie Sociologique 1, nr 16, (1987), 5-38. 
54.P. Smolensky.  Information Processing in Dynamical Systems: Foundation of Harmony 
Theory. In [49], 194-281. 
55.R. Swenson.  Emergent Attractors and the Law of Maximum Entropy Production: 
Foundation to a Theory of General Evolution.  Systems Research 6 (1989) 187-97. 
56.J. Uffink.  Measures of Uncertainty and the Uncertainty Principle, Ph. D. Thesis, State 
University Utrecht (1990). 
57.B. H. Weber, D. J. Depew, and J. D. Smith.  Entropy, Information, and Evolution, MIT, 
Cambridge, Mass./London (1988). 
  
 
 35
58.R. S. Westfall.  Force in Newton's Physics.  Macdonald, London (1971). 
59.S. Woolgar.  Science. The very idea.  Sage, Beverly Hills/London (1988). 
60.J. Yoder.  Unrolling Time. Christiaan Huygens and the mathematization of nature, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, etc. (1988). 
